The Roman Army
THE PRE
IMPERIAL ROMAN ARMY by J. Trede
This is a very brief account of
the early development of the Roman Army, from its formation to its adoption by
Augustus as an instrument of the Roman State. It is by no means exhaustive, and
is intended merely as an introduction for those who have not yet studied this
early period, and perhaps as an encouragement to do just that!
During the early centuries, the army of Rome was heavily influenced by the
Etruscan Army, which in turn had learned and borrowed much from the Greek City
States of Italy. The weapons and equipment were predominantly of Greek type and
origin, and most battles were fought on foot, using the well tried and tested
Greek 'phalanx'.
Recruitment was strictly based on citizenship and wealth. The assumption being
that only a man with property to lose could be expected to defend it
effectively, not to mention arming and equipping himself at his own expense.
These citizens were in turn classified by their wealth into 5 classes of
soldier. The wealthiest class formed the basis of the Legion, armed and equipped
in the manner of a Greek hoplite. The remaining four classes made up the rest of
the army in descending order of quality of arms and armour. Officers were
selected from leading citizens, and enrolled into the Order of Knights, or Equites.
Again at their own expense, but they were provided with a horse from the
public purse. At this stage, the army was very much a defensive formation,
called up as and when required.
In about 390BC, a massive Celtic invasion of Italy resulted in the sack and
burning of Rome. The Roman Army proved totally unable to defend its city, and
was easily swept aside. After the Celts departed with their spoils, it was
obvious that a serious reorganisation was essential to prevent any such disaster
in the future.
After some experimentation and evolution the Legion emerged as a battle
formation of three individual but flexible and interactive lines of soldiers.
Individually these were known as the Hastati, the Principes, and the Triarii..
The Hastati of the front line were the pick of the army. Young men,
well trained and well armed with sword, javelin and large shield or scutum.
The Principes behind them were older men, selected for their experience
and maturity. Possibly the best equipped, they were armed and armoured similarly
to the Hastati.
The Triarii of the third line were veterans, perhaps past their prime, but
still well armed. There was also a fourth line of soldiers, known as the Velites.
These came from the poorest class of citizens. Lightly armed with perhaps no
more than a javelin and a light round shield, they were used as skirmishers to
engage and perhaps draw the enemy onto the battle line proper. This task
achieved, the Velites would rapidly withdraw to the rear through gaps
left for them in the main battle line. The brunt of the attack was then absorbed
by the Hastati, who either held their own, or if unable to do so,
withdrew through the Principes. These now took up the fight, and if
necessary in their turn withdrew through the Triarii, who then took up
the fight. This situation was generally held to be a disaster. However, the one
advantage of this system was that it did give the commander an opportunity to
regroup his troops, and deploy them back into the battle line with fresh
impetus, as and where required.
The above mentioned formations and methods carried Rome to eventual victory over
Carthage in the Punic Wars. It was a close run thing at times, with Roman
commanders often showing a remarkable if typical lack of imagination and
flexibility. Hannibal quickly learned to exploit this weakness, and inflicted
some crushing defeats on many Roman armies. Eventually the equally typical
doggedness of the Romans was to prove decisive. The war was carried over to
north Africa by the newly emerging Roman Navy, which ultimately proved superior
to that of Carthage. The city was sacked, and Carthage as a power ceased to
exist.
It was during this period that the Roman Army began to establish its own
identity by the evolution of new battle tactics, and by adopting new weapons,
often copied from their enemies. Celtic type helmets and mail shirts were
adopted. The short Gladius Hispaniensis sword came from the Iberian
peninsula, and both the large Scutum shield and the Pilum javelin
seem to have been borrowed from other Italian tribes. By these methods, the army
of Rome became the most powerful and efficient force in Italy.
It must be remembered that by threats and coercion, the Romans usually managed
to enlist other neighbouring tribes to act as auxiliary troops. These 'allies'
were not always happy with this arrangement, showing an increasing reluctance to
send their young men to fight Rome's battles. This was eventually to result in
much bloodshed, especially in the last century BC.
During the 1st century BC, Roman influence was to expand rapidly, initially
eastwards, and finally culminating in Caesar's Gallic conquests. Naturally, this
new 'empire' would demand more and more troops to maintain it, and to enable
further expansion. Ironically, fresh levies of troops became available as a
result of the extremely bloody 'Social' wars between Rome and the disenchanted
Italian tribes. Though Rome prevailed, the result was a general extension of
Roman citizenship to the other tribes. These new citizens became instantly
eligible to serve in the Legions, and not just as 'Allied' irregulars or
auxiliaries.
However, there being no funds to establish these new legions, it fell upon
wealthy citizens to provide the necessaries. This resulted in many 'private'
armies, dependent on their founder and not on the Roman State. The Dictator
Sulla, is reputed to have been the first to instigate an oath of loyalty to
himself by his soldiers. Perhaps for this reason the 1st. century BC produced
some remarkable military figures. Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar, to name but
the most famous. Their personal ambitions inevitably led to conflict, and the
resulting civil wars occupied much of this century. But the empire continued to
expand as one or other of them pursued their ambitions overseas.
During this turbulent period, further fundamental changes occurred in the army.
Most of these have been attributed to the great soldier and statesman, Gaius
Marius, although many of these may already have been gradually evolving. What is
undisputed is that Marius opened up his legions to the very lowest citizen
class. Without property and wealth, these slum dwellers had always been excluded
from a military career. As civil and other wars took their toll, Marius
recruited unashamedly from the 'sweepings of the gutters of Rome'. He armed and
equipped them at his own expense, and provided them with a thorough military
training. Though derided by most of Roman society, Marius nevertheless had set a
precedent, and thus established the very first professional army. Totally loyal
to himself, of course.
The composition of the army also experienced another thorough revision during
this period. The weapons and equipment of the legionary soldier were
standardised, and the old distinctions between Hastati, Principes and Triarii
were abolished. All legionary soldiers became the same, and were trained in
a more flexible way of fighting. The main tactical formation became the Cohort,
consisting of 6 Centuries of 80 men. There were 10 Cohorts to each Legion,
giving a nominal strength of 4800 soldiers. The Legion became the focus of a
soldiers' loyalty, under the sacred Eagle standard, also reputedly established
by Marius.
After the battle of Actium, the victorious Octavian seized control of all Roman
forces. He disbanded all surplus legions, retaining about 28, which he
considered adequate for the defence of the Empire. Under the title of Augustus,
he received a personal oath of loyalty from every unit of the Roman Army, thus
ending a long period of strife and bloodshed.
The Army of the Principate, a
brief guide
To most people, this is
the 'classic' era of the Roman army, when legionaries equipped with the famous lorica
segmentata used javelin and short sword to subdue the barbarians and bring
the Pax Romana to the known world. These were tough, well trained,
superbly equipped and disciplined soldiers who collectively constituted the most
formidable fighting machine that the Ancient World had ever seen.
Nor is this popular view far removed from the truth.
The Achievements of the Divine Augustus.
It was the first Emperor of the Roman world, Augustus (-AD14) who transformed
the politically divisive and somewhat ad hoc military forces of the Republic
into a fully professional army with a consistent policy towards the security of
the Empire.
However much he may have tried to hide the fact from an adoring public, Augustus
was never under any illusions as to the military basis of his authority, making
very sure that the first and only loyalty of Rome's troops was to him alone and,
through him, to the Roman state. It was Augustus who made sure that they were
paid regularly ( three times a year at this time), generally out of his own
resources, it was Augustus who organised their retirement handouts of cash or
land, and it was to Augustus that the troops swore their oaths of allegiance
every January 1st. The Republic had failed to do any of these
essential tasks and had paid the ultimate price for its neglect of the military
Equally, it was Augustus who regularised their length of service, appointed all
military commanders and organised the campaigns (though seldom in person) which
brought them glory, booty and popular acclaim as the conquerors of more
territory than at any other time in the history of the Roman state. It need not
surprise us that they were devoted to Augustus and his family; indeed, the first
Emperor did his job so well that the army remained conspicuously loyal to any
Emperor who possessed the Julian name, even 'difficult' ones like Caligula and
Nero.
Indeed, for most of the first two centuries of Roman rule the army, with the
possible exception of the Praetorian guard, seemed to have abandoned its
political pretensions, though it was a foolish princeps who did not pay close
attention to his soldiers' welfare.
Augustus actually inherited some 60 legions after the battle of Actium (31BC )
but soon reduced this to 28 (c.150,000men) in the interests of political
security and his bank balance, ensuring that they were carefully distributed
throughout the Roman world in accordance with military imperatives and his own
political security- too many legions in one place might tempt unscrupulous
governors to emulate his rise to power.
The main concentrations were on the Rhine (8 legions), the Danube (7 legions)
and Syria (4 Legions), though Egypt, Africa and Spain also possessed permanent
legionary garrisons.
Of course, the Roman army was not simply comprised of citizen heavy infantry -
other troops were vital to perform those tasks that disdainful legionaries would
not countenance, such as providing cavalry, or firing arrows or scouting and it
was again Augustus who created a new professional force, the auxilia
(literally 'help troops') out of the irregular units of allies who had helped
Rome conquer most of her Empire in Republican times.
These auxiliaries also numbered over 150,000 men in total, organised into units
500 or, less frequently, 1,000 strong, and were raised from the non-citizen
inhabitants of the provinces and newly conquered lands. With their keen fighting
edge and specialised weapons and tactics, they soon became an indispensable part
of the Roman army, generally going into battle first, and sometimes showing
themselves capable of winning significant victories without involving the
legions at all.
Legionary organisation - citizen troops -a summary
Although total numbers of legions varied in this period, there were few changes
in structure. At this time each legion comprised approximately 5,000 fighting
men, all of whom were Roman citizens, organised into 10 Cohorts of c.480
men each. These cohorts were themselves subdivided into centuries which,
despite their name, by this period contained only 80 men. The smallest
subdivision was the contubernium, the Roman equivalent of a modern
section, which consisted of 8 legionaries who shared a tent whilst on campaign
and a pair of barrack rooms in their legionary fortress. Each legion also
possessed a small number of cavalrymen (about 120) to act a scouts and
messengers.
This represented the fighting strength of the legion and it is possible
that on paper the legions may actually have been 6,000 strong, with the
numbers being made up by men on secondment, working at headquarters, providing
the governor with intelligence officers or administrative staff or performing
other related functions. If these men are taken into consideration, then it is
possible that for administrative purposes, the century was composed of 100 men -
80 front line soldiers and 20 who were on permanent or semi-permanent detachment
from their parent legion
To make matters more difficult
for the historian, at some time during the first century, the tactical utility
of the First Cohort was enhanced by increasing it in size to 800 men, arranged
as five double centuries. This change is often associated with the Flavians and
can be archaeologically attested through the remains of fortress accommodation,
but its exact date is unknown.
The Officers
The commander of a legion in our
period was invariably a Senator of some standing - a man who had already had a
varied military and administrative career, and who had probably reached the rank
of praetor at Rome. His official title was legatus legionis
because, while theoretically the Emperor held all military power, in practice he
delegated it to trusted Senators. Such legionary legates were, on the
whole, tough, experienced and highly competent officers, though there were some
notable exceptions, and all must, at some time, have served as junior officers
or tribuni.
These young tribunes were known as tribuni laticlavii -'broad stripe
men' ( after the broad purple band found on the Senatorial toga) doing a short
stint as part of the Senatorial career structure and acting as staff officers
and aides-de-camp to the legate. More useful, however, were the tribuni
angusticlavii , the 'narrow stripe men' of Equestrian rank., professional
soldiers who had made the army their career and who could be expected to know
their business somewhat better.
Undoubtedly the most important officers in the legion, however, were the
centurions of which there were 60, one to each century, tough, seasoned soldiers
who were generally promoted from the ranks and whose quality was assured by the
fierce competition which existed, first to enter the centurionate and then to
gain promotion through the various centurial grades to the exalted rank of Chief
Centurion or Primus Pilus.
Centurions were distinguished by their equipment, ( including a vitis or
vine staff used to beat recalcitrant legionaries), their more spacious
barrack room accommodation, their relatively high levels of pay and their
privileges which included taking bribes to exempt soldiers from unpleasant
duties. The downside of life as a centurio was that he was expected to
lead his men from the front, so presumably casualties in battle must have been
disproportionately high amongst this particular rank.
The Principales
N.C.O's within the century
included the Signifer who bore the signum or standard of the
century, (which was, of course, the embodiment of the honour and spirit of the
unit) and who also acted as its banker; the Optio, so called because he
had been chosen by the centurion with a view to promotion to the
centurionate himself; and the Tesserarius who was in charge of passing on
the watchword.of the day. Other NCO's were to be found at legionary headquarters
dealing with the vast amount of paperwork generated by this highly bureaucratic
army
Milites Gregarii
The majority of soldiers were, of course, ordinary footslogging milites,
although even these had gradations, with soldiers who had earned exemption from
unpleasant duties being known as immmunes and those who had served their
time gaining the status of veteranus along with appropriate privileges.
Auxiliary organisation - non citizen troops.
The citizens of Rome provided excellent heavy infantry, but did not easily adapt
to other modes of fighting. For this, they relied on non-citizens recruited from
the newly won provinces whose national mode of fighting and raw, aggressive edge
provided varied and valuable assistance first in conquering, and then in
preserving Rome's Empire. Cavalry, slingers, mountain warfare troops, bargemen,
archers - Rome relied heavily on all of them.
It was Augustus who reorganised the ramshackle allied units of the Republic and
gave them regular status, conditions of service, pay and discharge. From his
time the auxilia became a permanent and professional part of the military
establishment, serving for 25 years and receiving Roman citizenship and a
diploma to prove it . Their pay and equipment may have been inferior to those of
the legions, but they offered a good career to many a semi-barbarian provincial
and the lure of citizenship with is many benefits often proved irresistible. In
this way Rome not only gained specialised troops, but also an excellent means of
developing Romanitas in the far flung provinces of the Empire.
Initially, units were often raised from local tribesmen who were allowed to
serve under their tribal leaders, but a number of problems caused by collusion
with the local populace in time of crisis meant that from mid-first century they
were not permitted to serve in their own areas and were always officered by
Romans. To start with, wherever they were serving, numbers were maintained by
regular recruitment in their original home areas, though this practice seems
generally to have lapsed and been replaced by local recruitment by the
mid-second century. Peculiarities of weaponry could, however, persist.
Most auxiliary units were 500 strong (at least on paper) ,though towards the end
of the first century we do encounter milliary units, 1000 strong. There were
three basic types of auxiliary unit :
Alae (literally 'wings'), crack, high status cavalry regiments, commanded by a Praefectus and divided into squadrons known as turmae, some 30 or 40 strong
Cohortes Peditatae , units of footsoldiers, divided into 6 centuries of 80 men each, also commanded by a praefectus. The legionary cohort is the obvious model.
Cohortes Equitatae these are part-mounted units , often regarded as low status, but their flexible combination of 380 infantry and 120 cavalry made them ideal for frontier duties in areas such as Northern Britain.
As the first century progressed command of an auxiliary unit was incorporated
into the normal career structure of the Equestrian class, with professional
soldiers first commanding an auxiliary cohort, transferring to the legions for a
few years as a military tribune, commanding an ala and then possibly moving on
into civilian administration as a procurator. There are also examples of
legionary centurions transferring over to the auxiliaries as away of furthering
their careers.
One of the problems inherent in the very success of the auxilia as an organ of
Romanisation was that as provincials became more civilised, so their warlike
qualities became somewhat blunted. and during the second century we find Rome
recruiting irregular units from amongst the barbarians across the frontier, the
so-called numeri and cunei, literally 'wedges' and 'units', with a
view to utilising their warlike qualities against fellow barbarians . This was a
policy that would develop considerably as recruitment within the Empire became
more difficult.
The army of the later
Empire
The army of the later
Empire has had a bad press, being widely regarded as a motley collection of half
trained , poorly equipped, incompetent peasant farmers associated with
increasing numbers of Germanic barbarians whose very presence diluted and
degraded the once proud Roman military machine.
This was an army that, even with its vastly increased numbers, proved ultimately
incapable of preventing the destruction of the Empire, so it clearly cannot have
been anywhere near as effective as its early Imperial counterpart, or so the
theory runs.
In any case, the later Empire was, as Gibbon saw it, a period of decline and
fall, and the army must surely have shared in the general degeneration of Roman
life and society.
Actually, this is to misunderstand both the nature and ethos of the later army
and that of the society of which it formed a part. The fourth century world may
have been very different from that of the Julio-Claudians but that difference
does not necessarily imply decline. Such moral judgements seem
inappropriate. First century society was not intrinsically 'better' than fourth
century society ( one only has to think of Britain's fourth century villas and
their mosaics) and the later Roman army was just as effective in pursuing the
defensive goals for which it was designed as its earlier counterpart was in
fulfilling Rome's expansionist mission.
In fact, the main reason for the evolution of the later military system was
precisely because the early Imperial army had proved incapable of dealing with
the changed conditions and the new threats to the Empire which emerged during
the later second and third centuries. Had the system not adapted to change, the
Empire would undoubtedly have collapsed considerably earlier than it actually
did.
Obviously the later army doesnít seem to compare very favourably with the
expansionist force of earlier days since by its very nature it was a defensive
army and defensive armies do not seem to hold much glamour. In addition, in
appearance there is no doubting that it seems to have more in common with the
Bayeux tapestry than with Trajan's column and one cannot argue with the fact
that this has much to do with the increasing proportion of 'barbarian' troops
serving Rome in the fourth century.
Yet appearances can be deceptive:
- A defensive army is not necessarily incompetent or weak - how expansionist is the British army today?
- Developing 'barbarisation' does not necessarily imply a decline in standards - even the much derided frontier troops or 'limitanei' were capable of putting up stiff resistance when the occasion arose, the commissariat was still able to organise the provision of military supplies on a colossal scale while so-called barbarian troops proved disciplined, skilled and conspicuously loyal in their service to the Roman state.
- In fact, the recruitment of soldiers from beyond the frontiers was only the culmination of a long-standing Roman tradition of employing the fighting skills of others to their advantage and it is hard to see where sufficient fighting men of the right quality could have been obtained in an Empire which by this time may well have lost much of its fighting edge thanks to its success in spreading the benefits of civilisation and which may well have been experiencing demographic problems. In any case, they did not become preponderant until the very end of the fourth century.
- Lack of body armour may make later Roman troops appear 'primitive' next to their earlier counterparts, but this only represents the normal fighting kit of troops from beyond the frontiers which then spread to those recruited from within the Empire. This does not mean that the later Empire was somehow in terminal technological decline - artillery was still very much in use at this time, while heavily armoured cavalry, the cataphracti and clibanarii , were employed in field armies throughout the Roman world and testified to the continuing skill of Roman armourers.
Evolution of the Later
Roman Army
The later Roman army was in many respects simply the evolutionary successor to
the army of the Principate - it had always been an adaptable, changing force-
yet it is also clear that the century between the death of Severus (211) and
that of Constantine (337) had a particularly profound effect on almost all
aspects of military life and organisation, dramatically accelerating trends
which had hitherto only been proceeding slowly.
This was a time of crisis for the Roman Empire, when many of the old certainties
of the classical world were swept away by barbarian invasion, repeated
usurpation, rampant inflation and political separatism in both East and West.
The Empire only survived by dramatically reordering itself, emerging in the
fourth century as an overtly absolutist military monarchy, with an
administration of almost 'Byzantine' complexity and an ethos more Mediaeval than
classical. Unsurprisingly, the army shared these changes to the full.
Changing Ethos and Strategy.
- First Century . The ethos of the army of the Principate had been one of aggression and expansion. Problems on the frontiers were dealt with by military action, often resulting in conquest, and any Emperor worth his salt was expected to be a "Propagator Imperii". Legionary bases and auxiliary forts were simply temporary winter quarters for mobile, offensive armies, and the confident belief was that, sooner or later, the Pax Romana would embrace the entire world.
One of the first cracks in the confident outlook of divine mission came with the
Clades Variani of
AD 9 when 3 legions and associated auxiliaries were massacred in the Teutoberger
Wald by Ger
manic barbarians. Clearly, Roman arms were not necessarily invincible, and
although further con
quests were made, Roman expansion began to slow down. The world outside the
Mediterranean
basin was looking increasingly unattractive and valueless and Rome was now in
any case close to
the natural limits of expansion that could be supported by her existing economic
and
administrative resources.
- Second Century. Gradually, momentum dwindled, temporary halting places hardened into stone built fortresses, the 8 legions poised on the Rhine to overrun 'free' Germany were reduced to 6 and then to 4, and the limits of advance crystallised into fixed frontiers, delimited first by roads, these then becoming festooned with watchtowers and palisades and finally, in some places, stone curtain walls. The word 'limes' which had once meant a road into enemy territory now came to mean a frontier parallel to enemy territory. Conquest was turning into consolidation and aggression into protection.
This is not to say that the Romans were hiding behind these frontier works. Far
from it, in fact,
since the basic military strategy was one of preclusive security, to exclude the
enemy from
Roman territory completely. This was achieved by maintaining effective
intelligence gathering
beyond the frontiers thereby facilitating rapid deployment of the auxiliary
forces stationed along
the frontier line and of the legions located somewhat further back with the aim
of confronting
the enemy on their territory, well beyond the limits of direct Roman
control. (This is assuming,
of course, that the often preferred diplomatic option was not being pursued).
- Third Century. Although preclusive security remained the ideal down to Diocletian and beyond, the varying threats to Roman territorial and political integrity which emerged in the third century made this an increasingly unattainable goal. At the same time as Rome dissipated her energies in civil war, her enemies beyond the frontiers were growing ever more powerful, with the revived Persian Empire inflicting a series of humiliating defeats in the East and, in the West, new confederations of barbarians such as the Germanic Alamanni (or 'all men') and Franks making damaging inroads into Roman territory, one of the worst being in 276 when perhaps 70 Gallo-Roman cities were plundered and devastated.
Such incursions occurred with alarming regularity along the length of the
frontiers during this
period, revealing the inability of the existing military arrangements to cope
with the new situation.
Legions and auxiliaries had put down roots and become relatively static; once
the barbarians had
broken through the relatively thinly held frontier line, there was nothing to
prevent them from
plundering soft targets in the interior provinces at will. The massive walls of
Aurelian, built in
the 270's to defend Rome herself, are eloquent testimony to the new insecurity.
Yet a new approach was developing. Third century Emperors spent little time at
Rome, often
originating in frontier provinces and spending most of their careers where the
action was. Natu
rally enough they tended to take their court around with them and attached to
this was the
comitatus or 'companions', at first (perhaps under Gallienus in mid-century)
an assemblage of
cavalry units possibly intended to form a highly mobile central reserve which
would enable the
Emperor to respond rapidly to any new incursions (or usurpations?) that might
arise This may
well mark the first stirrings of a new military strategy for the Empire
- Fourth Century. Some historians believe that Gallienus' force represents the precursor of the mobile field armies of the fourth century, later developed by Diocletian but brought to full fruition during the reign of the Emperor Constantine. Diocletian was certainly a crucial agent of recovery, responsible for restoring Rome's frontiers, but it appears to have been Constantine who finally abandoned the old idea of preclusive security in favour of a more flexible frontier-in depth approach to frontier control.
Later Roman Military
organisation.
Constantine spent much of his reign in military conflict, and out of his
experience was "forged the New Model Army of the Later Roman Empire".
Gone was the traditional division between legionaries (citizen heavy infantry)
and auxiliaries ( non-citizen light infantry and cavalry) , to be replaced by a
new distinction between the elite troops of the Emperor's mobile field army, the
comitatenses and the lower status ( though not necessarily less
effective) limitanei or frontier troops.
The Field Army
The Constantinian field army of comitatenses,
first officially recorded in 325, comprised both cavalry and infantry under
new commanders known as the Magister Equitum and the Magister
Peditum.. At this stage it retained its close physical link with the person
of the Emperor,( although it should not be confused with the elite units of the
Imperial bodyguard, the Scholae Palatini) but very quickly it
became obvious that the extent of the Empire meant that one central force could
not deal effectively with simultaneous threats on several fronts.
The result was that we find
detachments of comitatenses being stationed away from the Emperor and turning
into regional field armies , the most significant being those of Gaul, the East,
and
Illyricum. These were mobile troops who were not based in permanent forts, but
usually billeted in towns, a local rapid reaction force ready to respond to any
barbarian threat on their 'patch'. They were commanded by professional soldiers
known as 'comites' or counts, now that the old provincial governors had lost
their military powers, and they proved a credible and effective response to the
needs of the time.
The Frontier Troops
The limitanei were largely composed of the old legions and auxilia,(
though the former seem to have been reduced in strength to units of 1,000 or so)
with an admixture of newer units such as numeri and cunei, created during the
troubles of the third century. They were also no longer commanded by individual
provincial governors but by a regional Dux (such as the Dux
Britanniarum found in the Notitia), a professional soldier,
responsible for co-ordinating frontier defence in his area and liaising with his
immediate superior, the comes of the regional field army.
The old view that the limitanei were some kind of ineffectual peasant
militia, bound to the soil, does not seem to be borne out by the evidence :
units of limitanei were, on occasions, drafted into the field army as pseudocomitatenses
and even in their primary function of frontier defence, they were capable of
performing sterling service, as at the siege of Amida in 359, related by
Ammianus Marcellinus. They may not have received the best recruits, but, as
Southern and Dixon state, "this should not suggest that there were no
standards at all. The units were still organized and the procedure for enrolment
and recruitment was still properly carried out". In any case, as they point
out, if they were that bad, why didn't any late Roman Emperor do something about
the problem?
Defence in depth
In any case, they were essential
to the new system of Imperial defence. Rome now recognised that preclusive
security could not be achieved; instead the assumption was that the barbarians
would be able to penetrate Roman territory, and it was on Roman territory that
they would be dealt with.
The presence of the limitanei was intended to deter invasion in the first
place, but if it did happen, their role was to slow down the enemy advance and
to siphon off their troops by holding newly constructed strongpoints known as
'burgi' ( which also acted as resupply stations for the mobile field army),
fortified towns and other heavily fortified military sites along lines of
communication. This would help protect the local populace, deny food to the
invader, and most importantly, slow down enemy penetration, giving the field
army time to arrive and confront them in open battle.
This was a strategy which by and large worked, and the Romans were quite capable
of defeating superior numbers, such as in the Emperor Julian's great victory
over the Alamanni at Strasbourg in AD 357. It may well be represent a more
defensive posture than had been the case in earlier centuries, as reflected in
the heavily fortified nature of late Roman military installations, but this was
an active rather than a passive form of defence which served Rome well
during a period of recurrent crisis. If the Roman Empire in the West finally
gave way to the successor states in the fifth century, this has more to do with
ineluctable social, cultural and economic change than with any failure of Roman
military capabilities.
Further Reading
Primary Sources :
Ammianus Marcellinus, 'Histories ' - the only decent historian since Dio Cassius
Anonymous 'De Rebus Bellicis' - Plans for army reform addressed to Valentinian I
Historia Augusta - Histories of third century emperors, of dubious reliability
The Notitia Dignitatum - Late Roman government civilian and military handbook
Vegetius 'Epitoma Rei Militaris' - looks back to the good old days but still
useful for later army
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A. Cameron |
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The Later Roman Empire |
Juris Trede, 1998