The Roman Army


THE PRE IMPERIAL ROMAN ARMY by J. Trede

This is a very brief account of the early development of the Roman Army, from its formation to its adoption by Augustus as an instrument of the Roman State. It is by no means exhaustive, and is intended merely as an introduction for those who have not yet studied this early period, and perhaps as an encouragement to do just that!
During the early centuries, the army of Rome was heavily influenced by the Etruscan Army, which in turn had learned and borrowed much from the Greek City States of Italy. The weapons and equipment were predominantly of Greek type and origin, and most battles were fought on foot, using the well tried and tested Greek 'phalanx'.
Recruitment was strictly based on citizenship and wealth. The assumption being that only a man with property to lose could be expected to defend it effectively, not to mention arming and equipping himself at his own expense. These citizens were in turn classified by their wealth into 5 classes of soldier. The wealthiest class formed the basis of the Legion, armed and equipped in the manner of a Greek hoplite. The remaining four classes made up the rest of the army in descending order of quality of arms and armour. Officers were selected from leading citizens, and enrolled into the Order of Knights, or Equites. Again at their own expense, but they were provided with a horse from the public purse. At this stage, the army was very much a defensive formation, called up as and when required.
In about 390BC, a massive Celtic invasion of Italy resulted in the sack and burning of Rome. The Roman Army proved totally unable to defend its city, and was easily swept aside. After the Celts departed with their spoils, it was obvious that a serious reorganisation was essential to prevent any such disaster in the future.
After some experimentation and evolution the Legion emerged as a battle formation of three individual but flexible and interactive lines of soldiers. Individually these were known as the Hastati, the Principes, and the Triarii.. The Hastati of the front line were the pick of the army. Young men, well trained and well armed with sword, javelin and large shield or scutum. The Principes behind them were older men, selected for their experience and maturity. Possibly the best equipped, they were armed and armoured similarly to the Hastati.
The Triarii
of the third line were veterans, perhaps past their prime, but still well armed. There was also a fourth line of soldiers, known as the Velites. These came from the poorest class of citizens. Lightly armed with perhaps no more than a javelin and a light round shield, they were used as skirmishers to engage and perhaps draw the enemy onto the battle line proper. This task achieved, the Velites would rapidly withdraw to the rear through gaps left for them in the main battle line. The brunt of the attack was then absorbed by the Hastati, who either held their own, or if unable to do so, withdrew through the Principes. These now took up the fight, and if necessary in their turn withdrew through the Triarii, who then took up the fight. This situation was generally held to be a disaster. However, the one advantage of this system was that it did give the commander an opportunity to regroup his troops, and deploy them back into the battle line with fresh impetus, as and where required.
The above mentioned formations and methods carried Rome to eventual victory over Carthage in the Punic Wars. It was a close run thing at times, with Roman commanders often showing a remarkable if typical lack of imagination and flexibility. Hannibal quickly learned to exploit this weakness, and inflicted some crushing defeats on many Roman armies. Eventually the equally typical doggedness of the Romans was to prove decisive. The war was carried over to north Africa by the newly emerging Roman Navy, which ultimately proved superior to that of Carthage. The city was sacked, and Carthage as a power ceased to exist.
It was during this period that the Roman Army began to establish its own identity by the evolution of new battle tactics, and by adopting new weapons, often copied from their enemies. Celtic type helmets and mail shirts were adopted. The short Gladius Hispaniensis sword came from the Iberian peninsula, and both the large Scutum shield and the Pilum javelin seem to have been borrowed from other Italian tribes. By these methods, the army of Rome became the most powerful and efficient force in Italy.
It must be remembered that by threats and coercion, the Romans usually managed to enlist other neighbouring tribes to act as auxiliary troops. These 'allies' were not always happy with this arrangement, showing an increasing reluctance to send their young men to fight Rome's battles. This was eventually to result in much bloodshed, especially in the last century BC.
During the 1st century BC, Roman influence was to expand rapidly, initially eastwards, and finally culminating in Caesar's Gallic conquests. Naturally, this new 'empire' would demand more and more troops to maintain it, and to enable further expansion. Ironically, fresh levies of troops became available as a result of the extremely bloody 'Social' wars between Rome and the disenchanted Italian tribes. Though Rome prevailed, the result was a general extension of Roman citizenship to the other tribes. These new citizens became instantly eligible to serve in the Legions, and not just as 'Allied' irregulars or auxiliaries.
However, there being no funds to establish these new legions, it fell upon wealthy citizens to provide the necessaries. This resulted in many 'private' armies, dependent on their founder and not on the Roman State. The Dictator Sulla, is reputed to have been the first to instigate an oath of loyalty to himself by his soldiers. Perhaps for this reason the 1st. century BC produced some remarkable military figures. Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar, to name but the most famous. Their personal ambitions inevitably led to conflict, and the resulting civil wars occupied much of this century. But the empire continued to expand as one or other of them pursued their ambitions overseas.
During this turbulent period, further fundamental changes occurred in the army. Most of these have been attributed to the great soldier and statesman, Gaius Marius, although many of these may already have been gradually evolving. What is undisputed is that Marius opened up his legions to the very lowest citizen class. Without property and wealth, these slum dwellers had always been excluded from a military career. As civil and other wars took their toll, Marius recruited unashamedly from the 'sweepings of the gutters of Rome'. He armed and equipped them at his own expense, and provided them with a thorough military training. Though derided by most of Roman society, Marius nevertheless had set a precedent, and thus established the very first professional army. Totally loyal to himself, of course.
The composition of the army also experienced another thorough revision during this period. The weapons and equipment of the legionary soldier were standardised, and the old distinctions between Hastati, Principes and Triarii were abolished. All legionary soldiers became the same, and were trained in a more flexible way of fighting. The main tactical formation became the Cohort, consisting of 6 Centuries of 80 men. There were 10 Cohorts to each Legion, giving a nominal strength of 4800 soldiers. The Legion became the focus of a soldiers' loyalty, under the sacred Eagle standard, also reputedly established by Marius.
After the battle of Actium, the victorious Octavian seized control of all Roman forces. He disbanded all surplus legions, retaining about 28, which he considered adequate for the defence of the Empire. Under the title of Augustus, he received a personal oath of loyalty from every unit of the Roman Army, thus ending a long period of strife and bloodshed.

The Army of the Principate, a brief guide

To most people, this is the 'classic' era of the Roman army, when legionaries equipped with the famous lorica segmentata used javelin and short sword to subdue the barbarians and bring the Pax Romana to the known world. These were tough, well trained, superbly equipped and disciplined soldiers who collectively constituted the most formidable fighting machine that the Ancient World had ever seen.

Nor is this popular view far removed from the truth.

The Achievements of the Divine Augustus.


It was the first Emperor of the Roman world, Augustus (-AD14) who transformed the politically divisive and somewhat ad hoc military forces of the Republic into a fully professional army with a consistent policy towards the security of the Empire.

However much he may have tried to hide the fact from an adoring public, Augustus was never under any illusions as to the military basis of his authority, making very sure that the first and only loyalty of Rome's troops was to him alone and, through him, to the Roman state. It was Augustus who made sure that they were paid regularly ( three times a year at this time), generally out of his own resources, it was Augustus who organised their retirement handouts of cash or land, and it was to Augustus that the troops swore their oaths of allegiance every January 1st. The Republic had failed to do any of these essential tasks and had paid the ultimate price for its neglect of the military

Equally, it was Augustus who regularised their length of service, appointed all military commanders and organised the campaigns (though seldom in person) which brought them glory, booty and popular acclaim as the conquerors of more territory than at any other time in the history of the Roman state. It need not surprise us that they were devoted to Augustus and his family; indeed, the first Emperor did his job so well that the army remained conspicuously loyal to any Emperor who possessed the Julian name, even 'difficult' ones like Caligula and Nero.

Indeed, for most of the first two centuries of Roman rule the army, with the possible exception of the Praetorian guard, seemed to have abandoned its political pretensions, though it was a foolish princeps who did not pay close attention to his soldiers' welfare.

Augustus actually inherited some 60 legions after the battle of Actium (31BC ) but soon reduced this to 28 (c.150,000men) in the interests of political security and his bank balance, ensuring that they were carefully distributed throughout the Roman world in accordance with military imperatives and his own political security- too many legions in one place might tempt unscrupulous governors to emulate his rise to power.

The main concentrations were on the Rhine (8 legions), the Danube (7 legions) and Syria (4 Legions), though Egypt, Africa and Spain also possessed permanent legionary garrisons.

Of course, the Roman army was not simply comprised of citizen heavy infantry - other troops were vital to perform those tasks that disdainful legionaries would not countenance, such as providing cavalry, or firing arrows or scouting and it was again Augustus who created a new professional force, the auxilia (literally 'help troops') out of the irregular units of allies who had helped Rome conquer most of her Empire in Republican times.

These auxiliaries also numbered over 150,000 men in total, organised into units 500 or, less frequently, 1,000 strong, and were raised from the non-citizen inhabitants of the provinces and newly conquered lands. With their keen fighting edge and specialised weapons and tactics, they soon became an indispensable part of the Roman army, generally going into battle first, and sometimes showing themselves capable of winning significant victories without involving the legions at all.

Legionary organisation - citizen troops -a summary


Although total numbers of legions varied in this period, there were few changes in structure. At this time each legion comprised approximately 5,000 fighting men, all of whom were Roman citizens, organised into 10 Cohorts of c.480 men each. These cohorts were themselves subdivided into centuries which, despite their name, by this period contained only 80 men. The smallest subdivision was the contubernium, the Roman equivalent of a modern section, which consisted of 8 legionaries who shared a tent whilst on campaign and a pair of barrack rooms in their legionary fortress. Each legion also possessed a small number of cavalrymen (about 120) to act a scouts and messengers.

This represented the fighting strength of the legion and it is possible that on paper the legions may actually have been 6,000 strong, with the numbers being made up by men on secondment, working at headquarters, providing the governor with intelligence officers or administrative staff or performing other related functions. If these men are taken into consideration, then it is possible that for administrative purposes, the century was composed of 100 men - 80 front line soldiers and 20 who were on permanent or semi-permanent detachment from their parent legion

To make matters more difficult for the historian, at some time during the first century, the tactical utility of the First Cohort was enhanced by increasing it in size to 800 men, arranged as five double centuries. This change is often associated with the Flavians and can be archaeologically attested through the remains of fortress accommodation, but its exact date is unknown.

The Officers

The commander of a legion in our period was invariably a Senator of some standing - a man who had already had a varied military and administrative career, and who had probably reached the rank of praetor at Rome. His official title was legatus legionis because, while theoretically the Emperor held all military power, in practice he delegated it to trusted Senators. Such legionary legates were, on the whole, tough, experienced and highly competent officers, though there were some notable exceptions, and all must, at some time, have served as junior officers or tribuni.

These young tribunes were known as tribuni laticlavii -'broad stripe men' ( after the broad purple band found on the Senatorial toga) doing a short stint as part of the Senatorial career structure and acting as staff officers and aides-de-camp to the legate. More useful, however, were the tribuni angusticlavii , the 'narrow stripe men' of Equestrian rank., professional soldiers who had made the army their career and who could be expected to know their business somewhat better.
Undoubtedly the most important officers in the legion, however, were the centurions of which there were 60, one to each century, tough, seasoned soldiers who were generally promoted from the ranks and whose quality was assured by the fierce competition which existed, first to enter the centurionate and then to gain promotion through the various centurial grades to the exalted rank of Chief Centurion or Primus Pilus.

Centurions were distinguished by their equipment, ( including a vitis or vine staff used to beat recalcitrant legionaries), their more spacious barrack room accommodation, their relatively high levels of pay and their privileges which included taking bribes to exempt soldiers from unpleasant duties. The downside of life as a centurio was that he was expected to lead his men from the front, so presumably casualties in battle must have been disproportionately high amongst this particular rank.

The Principales

N.C.O's within the century included the Signifer who bore the signum or standard of the century, (which was, of course, the embodiment of the honour and spirit of the unit) and who also acted as its banker; the Optio, so called because he had been chosen by the centurion with a view to promotion to the centurionate himself; and the Tesserarius who was in charge of passing on the watchword.of the day. Other NCO's were to be found at legionary headquarters dealing with the vast amount of paperwork generated by this highly bureaucratic army

Milites Gregarii
The majority of soldiers were, of course, ordinary footslogging milites, although even these had gradations, with soldiers who had earned exemption from unpleasant duties being known as immmunes and those who had served their time gaining the status of veteranus along with appropriate privileges.

Auxiliary organisation - non citizen troops.


The citizens of Rome provided excellent heavy infantry, but did not easily adapt to other modes of fighting. For this, they relied on non-citizens recruited from the newly won provinces whose national mode of fighting and raw, aggressive edge provided varied and valuable assistance first in conquering, and then in preserving Rome's Empire. Cavalry, slingers, mountain warfare troops, bargemen, archers - Rome relied heavily on all of them.

It was Augustus who reorganised the ramshackle allied units of the Republic and gave them regular status, conditions of service, pay and discharge. From his time the auxilia became a permanent and professional part of the military establishment, serving for 25 years and receiving Roman citizenship and a diploma to prove it . Their pay and equipment may have been inferior to those of the legions, but they offered a good career to many a semi-barbarian provincial and the lure of citizenship with is many benefits often proved irresistible. In this way Rome not only gained specialised troops, but also an excellent means of developing Romanitas in the far flung provinces of the Empire.

Initially, units were often raised from local tribesmen who were allowed to serve under their tribal leaders, but a number of problems caused by collusion with the local populace in time of crisis meant that from mid-first century they were not permitted to serve in their own areas and were always officered by Romans. To start with, wherever they were serving, numbers were maintained by regular recruitment in their original home areas, though this practice seems generally to have lapsed and been replaced by local recruitment by the mid-second century. Peculiarities of weaponry could, however, persist.

Most auxiliary units were 500 strong (at least on paper) ,though towards the end of the first century we do encounter milliary units, 1000 strong. There were three basic types of auxiliary unit :

Alae (literally 'wings'), crack, high status cavalry regiments, commanded by a Praefectus and divided into squadrons known as turmae, some 30 or 40 strong

Cohortes Peditatae , units of footsoldiers, divided into 6 centuries of 80 men each, also commanded by a praefectus. The legionary cohort is the obvious model.

Cohortes Equitatae these are part-mounted units , often regarded as low status, but their flexible combination of 380 infantry and 120 cavalry made them ideal for frontier duties in areas such as Northern Britain.


As the first century progressed command of an auxiliary unit was incorporated into the normal career structure of the Equestrian class, with professional soldiers first commanding an auxiliary cohort, transferring to the legions for a few years as a military tribune, commanding an ala and then possibly moving on into civilian administration as a procurator. There are also examples of legionary centurions transferring over to the auxiliaries as away of furthering their careers.

One of the problems inherent in the very success of the auxilia as an organ of Romanisation was that as provincials became more civilised, so their warlike qualities became somewhat blunted. and during the second century we find Rome recruiting irregular units from amongst the barbarians across the frontier, the so-called numeri and cunei, literally 'wedges' and 'units', with a view to utilising their warlike qualities against fellow barbarians . This was a policy that would develop considerably as recruitment within the Empire became more difficult.


The army of the later Empire


The army of the later Empire has had a bad press, being widely regarded as a motley collection of half trained , poorly equipped, incompetent peasant farmers associated with increasing numbers of Germanic barbarians whose very presence diluted and degraded the once proud Roman military machine.

This was an army that, even with its vastly increased numbers, proved ultimately incapable of preventing the destruction of the Empire, so it clearly cannot have been anywhere near as effective as its early Imperial counterpart, or so the theory runs.

In any case, the later Empire was, as Gibbon saw it, a period of decline and fall, and the army must surely have shared in the general degeneration of Roman life and society.

Actually, this is to misunderstand both the nature and ethos of the later army and that of the society of which it formed a part. The fourth century world may have been very different from that of the Julio-Claudians but that difference does not necessarily imply decline. Such moral judgements seem
inappropriate. First century society was not intrinsically 'better' than fourth century society ( one only has to think of Britain's fourth century villas and their mosaics) and the later Roman army was just as effective in pursuing the defensive goals for which it was designed as its earlier counterpart was in fulfilling Rome's expansionist mission.

In fact, the main reason for the evolution of the later military system was precisely because the early Imperial army had proved incapable of dealing with the changed conditions and the new threats to the Empire which emerged during the later second and third centuries. Had the system not adapted to change, the Empire would undoubtedly have collapsed considerably earlier than it actually did.

Obviously the later army doesnít seem to compare very favourably with the expansionist force of earlier days since by its very nature it was a defensive army and defensive armies do not seem to hold much glamour. In addition, in appearance there is no doubting that it seems to have more in common with the Bayeux tapestry than with Trajan's column and one cannot argue with the fact that this has much to do with the increasing proportion of 'barbarian' troops serving Rome in the fourth century.

Yet appearances can be deceptive:

  • A defensive army is not necessarily incompetent or weak - how expansionist is the British army today?
  • Developing 'barbarisation' does not necessarily imply a decline in standards - even the much derided frontier troops or 'limitanei' were capable of putting up stiff resistance when the occasion arose, the commissariat was still able to organise the provision of military supplies on a colossal scale while so-called barbarian troops proved disciplined, skilled and conspicuously loyal in their service to the Roman state.
  • In fact, the recruitment of soldiers from beyond the frontiers was only the culmination of a long-standing Roman tradition of employing the fighting skills of others to their advantage and it is hard to see where sufficient fighting men of the right quality could have been obtained in an Empire which by this time may well have lost much of its fighting edge thanks to its success in spreading the benefits of civilisation and which may well have been experiencing demographic problems. In any case, they did not become preponderant until the very end of the fourth century.
  • Lack of body armour may make later Roman troops appear 'primitive' next to their earlier counterparts, but this only represents the normal fighting kit of troops from beyond the frontiers which then spread to those recruited from within the Empire. This does not mean that the later Empire was somehow in terminal technological decline - artillery was still very much in use at this time, while heavily armoured cavalry, the cataphracti and clibanarii , were employed in field armies throughout the Roman world and testified to the continuing skill of Roman armourers.


Evolution of the Later Roman Army

The later Roman army was in many respects simply the evolutionary successor to the army of the Principate - it had always been an adaptable, changing force- yet it is also clear that the century between the death of Severus (211) and that of Constantine (337) had a particularly profound effect on almost all aspects of military life and organisation, dramatically accelerating trends which had hitherto only been proceeding slowly.

This was a time of crisis for the Roman Empire, when many of the old certainties of the classical world were swept away by barbarian invasion, repeated usurpation, rampant inflation and political separatism in both East and West. The Empire only survived by dramatically reordering itself, emerging in the fourth century as an overtly absolutist military monarchy, with an administration of almost 'Byzantine' complexity and an ethos more Mediaeval than classical. Unsurprisingly, the army shared these changes to the full.

 

Changing Ethos and Strategy.

  • First Century . The ethos of the army of the Principate had been one of aggression and expansion. Problems on the frontiers were dealt with by military action, often resulting in conquest, and any Emperor worth his salt was expected to be a "Propagator Imperii". Legionary bases and auxiliary forts were simply temporary winter quarters for mobile, offensive armies, and the confident belief was that, sooner or later, the Pax Romana would embrace the entire world.


One of the first cracks in the confident outlook of divine mission came with the Clades Variani of
AD 9 when 3 legions and associated auxiliaries were massacred in the Teutoberger Wald by Ger
manic barbarians. Clearly, Roman arms were not necessarily invincible, and although further con
quests were made, Roman expansion began to slow down. The world outside the Mediterranean
basin was looking increasingly unattractive and valueless and Rome was now in any case close to
the natural limits of expansion that could be supported by her existing economic and
administrative resources.

  • Second Century. Gradually, momentum dwindled, temporary halting places hardened into stone built fortresses, the 8 legions poised on the Rhine to overrun 'free' Germany were reduced to 6 and then to 4, and the limits of advance crystallised into fixed frontiers, delimited first by roads, these then becoming festooned with watchtowers and palisades and finally, in some places, stone curtain walls. The word 'limes' which had once meant a road into enemy territory now came to mean a frontier parallel to enemy territory. Conquest was turning into consolidation and aggression into protection.


This is not to say that the Romans were hiding behind these frontier works. Far from it, in fact,
since the basic military strategy was one of preclusive security, to exclude the enemy from
Roman territory completely. This was achieved by maintaining effective intelligence gathering
beyond the frontiers thereby facilitating rapid deployment of the auxiliary forces stationed along
the frontier line and of the legions located somewhat further back with the aim of confronting
the enemy on their territory, well beyond the limits of direct Roman control. (This is assuming,
of course, that the often preferred diplomatic option was not being pursued).

  • Third Century. Although preclusive security remained the ideal down to Diocletian and beyond, the varying threats to Roman territorial and political integrity which emerged in the third century made this an increasingly unattainable goal. At the same time as Rome dissipated her energies in civil war, her enemies beyond the frontiers were growing ever more powerful, with the revived Persian Empire inflicting a series of humiliating defeats in the East and, in the West, new confederations of barbarians such as the Germanic Alamanni (or 'all men') and Franks making damaging inroads into Roman territory, one of the worst being in 276 when perhaps 70 Gallo-Roman cities were plundered and devastated.


Such incursions occurred with alarming regularity along the length of the frontiers during this
period, revealing the inability of the existing military arrangements to cope with the new situation.
Legions and auxiliaries had put down roots and become relatively static; once the barbarians had
broken through the relatively thinly held frontier line, there was nothing to prevent them from
plundering soft targets in the interior provinces at will. The massive walls of Aurelian, built in
the 270's to defend Rome herself, are eloquent testimony to the new insecurity.

Yet a new approach was developing. Third century Emperors spent little time at Rome, often
originating in frontier provinces and spending most of their careers where the action was. Natu
rally enough they tended to take their court around with them and attached to this was the
comitatus
or 'companions', at first (perhaps under Gallienus in mid-century) an assemblage of
cavalry units possibly intended to form a highly mobile central reserve which would enable the
Emperor to respond rapidly to any new incursions (or usurpations?) that might arise This may
well mark the first stirrings of a new military strategy for the Empire

  • Fourth Century. Some historians believe that Gallienus' force represents the precursor of the mobile field armies of the fourth century, later developed by Diocletian but brought to full fruition during the reign of the Emperor Constantine. Diocletian was certainly a crucial agent of recovery, responsible for restoring Rome's frontiers, but it appears to have been Constantine who finally abandoned the old idea of preclusive security in favour of a more flexible frontier-in depth approach to frontier control.


Later Roman Military organisation.

Constantine spent much of his reign in military conflict, and out of his experience was "forged the New Model Army of the Later Roman Empire". Gone was the traditional division between legionaries (citizen heavy infantry) and auxiliaries ( non-citizen light infantry and cavalry) , to be replaced by a new distinction between the elite troops of the Emperor's mobile field army, the comitatenses and the lower status ( though not necessarily less effective) limitanei or frontier troops.

The Field Army

The Constantinian field army of comitatenses, first officially recorded in 325, comprised both cavalry and infantry under new commanders known as the Magister Equitum and the Magister Peditum.. At this stage it retained its close physical link with the person of the Emperor,( although it should not be confused with the elite units of the Imperial bodyguard, the Scholae Palatini) but very quickly it became obvious that the extent of the Empire meant that one central force could not deal effectively with simultaneous threats on several fronts.

The result was that we find detachments of comitatenses being stationed away from the Emperor and turning into regional field armies , the most significant being those of Gaul, the East, and
Illyricum. These were mobile troops who were not based in permanent forts, but usually billeted in towns, a local rapid reaction force ready to respond to any barbarian threat on their 'patch'. They were commanded by professional soldiers known as 'comites' or counts, now that the old provincial governors had lost their military powers, and they proved a credible and effective response to the needs of the time.

The Frontier Troops


The limitanei were largely composed of the old legions and auxilia,( though the former seem to have been reduced in strength to units of 1,000 or so) with an admixture of newer units such as numeri and cunei, created during the troubles of the third century. They were also no longer commanded by individual provincial governors but by a regional Dux (such as the Dux Britanniarum found in the Notitia), a professional soldier, responsible for co-ordinating frontier defence in his area and liaising with his immediate superior, the comes of the regional field army.

The old view that the limitanei were some kind of ineffectual peasant militia, bound to the soil, does not seem to be borne out by the evidence : units of limitanei were, on occasions, drafted into the field army as pseudocomitatenses and even in their primary function of frontier defence, they were capable of performing sterling service, as at the siege of Amida in 359, related by Ammianus Marcellinus. They may not have received the best recruits, but, as Southern and Dixon state, "this should not suggest that there were no standards at all. The units were still organized and the procedure for enrolment and recruitment was still properly carried out". In any case, as they point out, if they were that bad, why didn't any late Roman Emperor do something about the problem?

Defence in depth

In any case, they were essential to the new system of Imperial defence. Rome now recognised that preclusive security could not be achieved; instead the assumption was that the barbarians would be able to penetrate Roman territory, and it was on Roman territory that they would be dealt with.

The presence of the limitanei was intended to deter invasion in the first place, but if it did happen, their role was to slow down the enemy advance and to siphon off their troops by holding newly constructed strongpoints known as 'burgi' ( which also acted as resupply stations for the mobile field army), fortified towns and other heavily fortified military sites along lines of communication. This would help protect the local populace, deny food to the invader, and most importantly, slow down enemy penetration, giving the field army time to arrive and confront them in open battle.

This was a strategy which by and large worked, and the Romans were quite capable of defeating superior numbers, such as in the Emperor Julian's great victory over the Alamanni at Strasbourg in AD 357. It may well be represent a more defensive posture than had been the case in earlier centuries, as reflected in the heavily fortified nature of late Roman military installations, but this was an active rather than a passive form of defence which served Rome well during a period of recurrent crisis. If the Roman Empire in the West finally gave way to the successor states in the fifth century, this has more to do with ineluctable social, cultural and economic change than with any failure of Roman military capabilities.


Further Reading

Primary Sources :

Ammianus Marcellinus, 'Histories ' - the only decent historian since Dio Cassius
Anonymous 'De Rebus Bellicis' - Plans for army reform addressed to Valentinian I
Historia Augusta - Histories of third century emperors, of dubious reliability
The Notitia Dignitatum - Late Roman government civilian and military handbook Vegetius 'Epitoma Rei Militaris' - looks back to the good old days but still useful for later army

A. Cameron
BT Cornell and J. Matthews
P. Connolly
A.Ferrill
S. Johnson
A.H.M. Jones
A.H. M. Jones
A.H.M. Jones
E.M. Luttwak
R. Macmullen
R. Macmullen
Pat Southern and Karen Dixon
S. Williams

The Later Roman Empire
Atlas of the Roman World
Greece and Rome at War
The Fall of the Roman Empire, the Military explanation.
Later Roman Britain
Constantine and the conversion of Europe
The Decline of the Ancient World
The Later Roman Empire
The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire
Constantine
Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire
The late Roman Army.
Diocletian and the Roman Recovery

 

 

Juris Trede, 1998